Next-Generation CCA Should Protect Tankers and Early-Warning Aircraft Against China
There are growing calls for the U.S. Air Force’s next-generation unmanned combat system, the CCA (Collaborative Combat Aircraft), to take on defensive missions alongside offensive operations—including protecting high-value airborne assets such as airborne early warning and control aircraft and aerial refueling tankers. In a potential air war with China, the survivability of support aircraft—not just the number and firepower of fighter jets—could determine a nation’s ability to sustain combat operations.
Greg Malandrino, a senior fellow at the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, argued in an op-ed published by the U.S. outlet Breaking Defense on Sept. 3, 2026, that protecting high-value airborne assets should be a core mission of the next phase of the CCA program.
CCA Means Collaborative Combat Aircraft—not “Combat-Capable Aircraft”
CCA stands for Collaborative Combat Aircraft, not Combat Capable Aircraft. The U.S. Air Force is developing the CCA as a semi-autonomous unmanned combat aircraft designed to operate alongside crewed fighters. Its central concept is to carry out missions under a pilot’s direction while distributing sensors and weapons across the force.
The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has said that CCAs will operate alongside fifth- and sixth-generation crewed fighters and could perform a range of missions, including forward surveillance, air-to-air attacks and electronic warfare. The concept is intended to reinforce the fighter force by generating large numbers of aircraft at a relatively low cost.
In June 2026, the U.S. Air Force moved forward with manufacturing and production-related contracts involving aircraft from General Atomics and Anduril under the CCA Increment 1 program. According to official announcements, the long-term plan calls for acquiring roughly 1,000 combat-capable CCAs, with a goal of procuring more than 150 by the end of the decade.
High-Value Airborne Assets Are Vulnerable in a War with China
U.S. air operations cannot be sustained by fighter jets alone. Airborne early warning and control aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are critical assets that provide battlefield information and extend the operational range of fighters. But their large size makes them easier to detect, while they lack the robust self-defense capabilities of fighter aircraft.
In his Breaking Defense op-ed, Malandrino highlighted the possibility that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force could use long-range air-to-air missiles to threaten U.S. high-value airborne assets. If that threat materializes, U.S. fighters could be forced to devote substantial resources to protecting tankers and early-warning aircraft instead of conducting offensive missions.
Drawing on the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2026 military balance data, he presented a simplified calculation suggesting that protecting high-value airborne assets could significantly reduce the operational availability of U.S. fighters. In other words, as the “cost of protection” rises, fewer U.S. fighters remain available to engage Chinese aircraft directly.
Defending HVAAs Should Be a Core Mission for the Next CCA
Malandrino’s proposed solution is to make HVAA (High-Value Airborne Assets) defense the primary mission of CCA Increment 2. If CCAs are equipped for long-range air-to-air engagements and escort early-warning aircraft and tankers, crewed fighters could be freed from defensive duties and focus on offensive operations designed to pressure the opposing air force.
This concept differs from viewing the CCA merely as an “assistant” to crewed fighters. In addition to complementing the sensors and weapons of crewed aircraft, CCAs could, in certain situations, form independent defensive formations and intercept threats around support aircraft.
The open software architecture and autonomous systems structure being pursued by the U.S. Air Force could also facilitate this expansion of missions. The Air Force is separating the aircraft from mission-autonomy software so that multiple contractors can continuously improve performance. Even if the mission changes, this approach leaves greater room for modular integration of sensors, electronic warfare equipment and weapons.
Flexibility to Shift Between Offensive and Defensive Missions Is Key
For the CCA to become a credible force against China, it cannot be designed around offense and defense as entirely separate missions. Early in a conflict, it may need to detect enemy air forces and long-range threats; later, it could conduct air-to-air attacks alongside crewed fighters; and when necessary, it would need to shift roles and protect tankers and early-warning aircraft.
However, the level of autonomy and reliance on datalinks remain unresolved challenges. In a conflict with China, electronic warfare and communications jamming could occur simultaneously. That makes it essential to design CCAs capable of carrying out at least basic detection, evasion and defensive missions even when communications are degraded.
CSBA has assessed that the CCA program cannot be completed through technology development alone. Deployment concepts, operations, training, maintenance and production systems must all be prepared in parallel. Ultimately, the success of the CCA will depend not only on the aircraft’s performance, but also on which missions it is assigned first and how effectively it is integrated with crewed forces.
The Next Step for the U.S. CCA Program Is Mission Redesign
The U.S. Air Force is already developing the CCA to expand the combat mass and operational reach of crewed fighters. But in a long-range air war with China, simply increasing the number of fighters will not be enough. If tankers and early-warning aircraft cannot survive, the broader command-and-control architecture of U.S. air operations could be weakened.
Next-generation CCAs will therefore need a mix of missions combining air-to-air attacks with high-value airborne asset escort, long-range interception, electronic-warfare support and forward surveillance. Malandrino’s proposal would expand the CCA from an “unmanned combat aircraft for offensive operations” into a distributed defensive network protecting the entire U.S. air campaign.
The U.S. challenge in responding to China’s military buildup is not limited to building a more capable individual platform. Crewed and uncrewed aircraft, sensors and command-and-control systems must be integrated into a single combat system. Designing defensive missions for the CCA early in that process is likely to be a critical factor.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
What is a CCA?
CCA stands for Collaborative Combat Aircraft, referring to an unmanned aircraft designed to operate alongside crewed fighters. It is being developed to fly semi-autonomously under a pilot’s direction and perform missions such as surveillance, air-to-air attacks and electronic warfare.
How is the U.S. CCA different from a conventional unmanned aircraft?
Rather than serving simply as a remotely piloted reconnaissance aircraft, the CCA is designed from the outset to operate as part of a team with crewed fighters. It shares sensors and data with those aircraft and can carry out offensive or defensive missions depending on the situation.
Why should CCAs protect tankers and early-warning aircraft?
Aerial refueling tankers and early-warning aircraft are critical assets that determine fighters’ operational range and battlefield awareness. If they come under attack, the range of fighter operations and the ability to command and control forces could be weakened at the same time.
What is the difference between CCA Increment 1 and Increment 2?
Increment 1 is the initial CCA phase that the U.S. Air Force plans to field first, with an emphasis on cooperation with crewed fighters and air-combat capabilities. Increment 2 has not yet reached the stage at which specific aircraft and missions have been finalized, but new missions such as high-value airborne asset defense are under discussion.
Can CCAs directly defend against Chinese cyberattacks?
The CCA’s primary role is in air operations, and it is not classified as a system designed to directly defend against cyberattacks. However, it could help sustain operations in the face of communications jamming and electromagnetic threats through electronic warfare, communications protection and distributed datalinks.
How many CCAs does the United States plan to acquire?
The U.S. Air Force has outlined a long-term plan to acquire roughly 1,000 combat-capable CCAs. Under the initial Increment 1 program, it has announced a goal of acquiring more than 150 by the end of the decade.
